Abstract: This study investigates how family ownership affects earnings quality and firm value of firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) in the post crisis period 2000-2008 using panel data set. Existing studies show that family ownership may either reduce or aggravate agency problems, suggesting that family ownership overlaps between type I and II agency problems. These unique characteristics of family ownership may affect firm value and quality of earnings. Korean firms exhibit some of the highest levels of family ownership, specifically affiliated ownership in the world. I classify family ownership into three categories: family ownership, pure family ownership and affiliated ownership. I find all three family ownership measures are positively associated with firm value and earnings quality. This result supports that family ownership mitigates agency problems, thereby improving firm value and earnings quality. However, family ownership of chaebol groups (business group) in Korea negatively affects firm value and earnings quality. Controlling family shareholders of chaebol groups have a dominant influence on firms they invest in using affiliated ownership. Significant affiliated ownership of chaebol groups, results in low firm value and earnings quality.